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Private Actor or Public Authority?  How the Status of Communications Service Providers affects 
Human Rights 
By Allison M Holmes* 
 
Abstract 
Communications data retention, regarding the who, where, how and when of internet and mobile 
telephony communications, is a law enforcement tool which has recently been at the forefront of 
public debate in the United Kingdom.  This data is collected and retained by the private sector, 
specifically Communications Service Providers (CSPs), and is later accessed by relevant law 
enforcement agencies.  Such a system of retention effectively imposes the role and duties of a 
public authority on a private company.  These companies act as intermediaries who operate 
enforcement mechanisms via the network infrastructure.  Despite this, CSPs are treated as 
private actors in the relevant statutes.  This impacts directly on human rights, particularly 
privacy, as private actors are turned into the instruments of privacy intrusions.  The private status 
of CSPs limits the protections guaranteed to individuals, given that the provisions of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 provide for the conduct of public authorities but, in general, do not apply to 
private companies.  Private companies which exercise functions of a public nature however, may 
fall under the remit of the HRA. It is argued that the communications data retention regime, 
particularly following the passage of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 which placed 
additional obligations on CSPs, and the powers under the Investigatory Powers Act, have, by 
implication, altered their status, making WKHPµfunctional public authorities¶)ROORZLQJRQIURP
that, it is contended this regime offers insufficient protections; the human rights of individuals 
affected by the retention policies and practice would be better served by clarifying relevant 
legislation to ensure that CSPs are performing functions of a public nature when complying with 
statutory retention requirements.  
 
Introduction 
Communications data retention, regarding the who, where, how and when of internet and mobile 
telephony communications is an effective and accepted law enforcement tool which has recently 
been at the forefront of public debate in the United Kingdom.  The communications data broadly 
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falls into three categories encompassing subscriber data,1 service data,2 and traffic data,3 and can 
be broadly characterized as data which pertains to the context of what is said but not the content 
of the communication itself.  This data plays a key role in current law enforcement and national 
VHFXULW\RSHUDWLRQV,QGHHGLQDVWXG\IRXQGWKDWµFRPPXQLFDWLRQVGDWDKDVSOD\HGD
significant role in every Security Service counter-terrorism operation over the last decade and 
has been used as evidence in 95% of all serious organized crime cases handled by the Crown 
3URVHFXWLRQ6HUYLFH¶4  The data offers significant benefits for those involved in the detection and 
investigation of crime.  It is relied upon to provide both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, 
reveal a suspect¶s movements, reveal links between suspects, enable the discovery of other key 
offenders, determine the last known whereabouts of victims, highlight inconsistencies in 
accounts by suspects, and corroborate the testimony of victims.5   
Communications data is collected and retained by the private sector, specifically, 
communications service providers (CSPs),6 for later access by approved public authorities.  CSPs 
are companies which run public telecommunications services for both internet and telephone 
communications.  The definition of CSPs is broad, and potentially includes companies such as 
Virgin and BT which are primary providers of broadband and telecom services and companies 
like Google or Yahoo which facilitate e-mail communications.  It may further be extended to 
websites and applications which are not traditional communications suppliers, but which provide 
                                                          
*Kent Law School, University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NZ. Special thanks to Professor Dermot P Walsh MRIA 
and Dr. Sinéad Ring for reviewing a draft of this article and to the anonymous reviewer for their comments.   
1
 This is information held or obtained by a CSP in relation to a customer, including their name, address, and 
telephone number.   
2
 This consists of the use made by any person of a CSP and for how long, for example, an itemized phone record 
showing the date, time, and duration of calls and to what number each was made.   
3
 Traffic data is data comprised in or attached to a communication by means of which it is being or may be 
transmitted, e.g. who the user contacted and at what time, the location of the person contacted, and the location of 
the users.   
4
 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act Consultation: Acquisition and Disclosure of Communications Data and 
Retention of Communications Data Codes of Practice (2014). Noted in this are several examples of cases where this 
information was used.  This included: Operation Frant where telephone evidence of cell site data and call logs 
revealed participants of a drug ring binging high grade heroin into London; Operation Backfill where internet data 
was used to identify perpetrators of armed robberies; and Operation Notarise which led to the arrest of over 600 
suspected paedophiles.  See also: Anderson, D A Question of Trust (Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation 
June 2015) Annex 10 339-341. 
5
 May, Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner March 2015 (HC1113, 2015) para 7.65. 
6
 For the purposes of this paper, CSPs will be defined as providers of a public telecommunication system, where that 
system exists for facilitating the transmission of communications by any means involving the use of electrical or 
electromagnetic energy (Investigatory Powers Bill 2016 s 233(2)).  This includes where the service participates in 
the management or storage of communications transmitted or that may be transmitted.   
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communications over the top of these services which might be caught under this definition, such 
as Facebook and Whatsapp.  CSPs are the dominant instruments through which all 
communications now occur; it is essentially impossible to communicate electronically without 
utilizing one of these services.7  The prevalence of mobile telephones and the internet has 
resulted in an expansive increase in the amount of data generated by even the most innocuous of 
transactions.  This data is far more encompassing and revealing than that derived from traditional 
communications systems.8  )RUH[DPSOHµ>W@KHIUHTXHQF\DQGtimes of communications reveal 
WKHVWUHQJWKDQGW\SHRISHRSOH¶VUHODWLRQV7KHQXPEHURISHRSOHWZRSDUWLHVNQRZLQFRPPRQ
is an indication of the social cohesion of their groups.  The co-locations of mobile devices at day 
or night is an indicator of friHQGVKLSRULQWLPDWHUHODWLRQV¶9  The scale and scope of 
communications data ensures it can provide a comprehensive account of a large portion of a 
SHUVRQ¶VOLIH10 Further, the common roles associated with CSPs have been altered.  
Traditionally, these companies were seen as intermediaries, merely connecting two parties.  
Whilst this remains a key function, their role has expanded.  CSPs provide not only 
communications, but also opportunities for social interaction, research, purchases, education, and 
so on.  This growth in personal data retention has not been accompanied by concurrent 
developments in the law which address the privacy issues posed by the enhanced data capture. 
At issue herein is the collection and retention of this communications data by CSPs for future use 
and access by law enforcement agencies.  While both retention and access have implications for 
human rights, it is the former only which will be the focus in this paper, as collection and 
retention present distinct concerns for CSPs which have not been adequately addressed by 
legislation.  In this context, retention is the storing of all communications and transactions for a 
set period, which is longer than would typically be used for billing and engineering purposes,11 
to facilitate future access for public authorities.  The retention requirements placed on CSPs 
                                                          
7
 As of 2016, 89% of households in Great Britain had internet access.  71% of adults in the UK use smart phones 
and 70RIDGXOWVXVHLQWHUQHWµRQ-WKHµJR¶See: Prescott C, 'Internet access - households and individuals: 2016' 
(Office of National Statistics 2016). 
8
 See for example the ability of location data to track an accurate picture of your movements in: 'Tell-All Telephone' 
Die Zeit (Zeit Online 31 Aug 2009 2009). There is no historical equivalent to this other than targeted surveillance.   
9
 LSE Policy Engagement Network, Briefing on the Interception Modernisation Programme (London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 2009). 
10
 This was acknowledged by the CJEU in the AG opinion Cruz Villalon in the case of Digital Rights Ireland Case 
C-293/12 (2013) ECLI-845. 
11
 Whitley E and Hosein I, 'Policy discourse and data retention: The technology politics of surveillance in the United 
Kingdom' (2005) 29 Telecom P 857. 
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under the relevant instruments require data to be kept on all service users, installing a blanket 
measure which occurs irrespective of individual suspicion or judicial authorization.  Whilst the 
value of this data for law enforcement is clear, its value to the CSPs is negligible.  Despite the 
clear value to the public interest, the retention of communications data is not treated as a public 
function.  In discharging these functions, CSPs are regarded as private actors in the relevant 
statutes.  This impacts directly on human rights, particularly privacy, 12 as private actors are 
turned into instruments of privacy intrusions without the subsequent protections offered under 
the Human Rights Act.  It is argued that this interpretation of CSPs as private actors is incorrect.  
This paper will examine the status of CSPs in the retention of communications data with the aim 
of demonstrating how those functions can EHLQWHUSUHWHGDVµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶WKHUHE\
placing the CSPs within the scope of the Human Rights Act 1998.   
Functions of a Public Nature 
7KH+XPDQ5LJKWV$FW+5$ZDVLQWHQGHGWRµEULQJULJKWVKRPH¶ to the public, making 
the rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) enforceable in a direct 
and readily accessible manner.13 In doing so, the HRA rooted the provisions of the ECHR in 
domestic statute, thereby providing individuals with effective remedies in UK courts for a breach 
of their Convention rights.  However, the HRA does not provide for blanket protection for all 
interferences with human rights. It is restricted primarily to breaches which occur consequent on 
WKHDFWLRQVRIµSXEOLFDXWKRULWLHV¶6SHFLILFDOO\6HFWLRQ+5$VWDWHVWKDWµ>L@WLVXQODZIXOIRUD
public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a convenWLRQULJKW¶Critically, 
6HFWLRQESURYLGHVWKDWDµSXEOLFDXWKRULW\¶FDQLQFOXGHµDQ\SHUVRQFHUWDLQRIZKRVH
IXQFWLRQVDUHIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶DQGVHFWLRQQRWHVWKDWµLQUHODWLRQWRD
particular act, a person is not a public authority by virtue of only subsection 3(b) if the nature of 
WKHDFWLVSULYDWH¶7DNHQWRJHWKHUWKHVHWZRVXEVHFWLRQVSURYLGHWKDWDQ\SHUVRQor body whose 
functions are of a public nature will be a public authority, other than in relation to those 
                                                          
12
 Mere retention has been held to be a violation of Article 8.  See Weber & Saravia v Germany App no 54394/00 
(ECHR 29 June 2006); Liberty & Ors v GCHQ & Ors 2014 UKIPTrib 13_77-H 5 Dec 2014; Digital Rights Ireland 





(1999) CLJUK 159. 
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particular acts which are of a private nature.  These provisions allow for the requirements of the 
+5$WREHHQIRUFHGDJDLQVWSULYDWHERGLHVLQFDVHVZKHUHWKH\DUHSHUIRUPLQJµIXQFWLRQVRID
SXEOLFQDWXUH¶14  )RUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKLVDUWLFOHWKHVHERGLHVZLOOEHUHIHUUHGWRDVµIXQFWLRQal 
SXEOLFDXWKRULWLHV¶ 
While the expanded definition of a public authority extends the scope of the HRA, the statute is 
unclear as to ZKDWSUHFLVHO\LVPHDQWE\µIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶,WLVWKHUHIRUHLPSRUWDQW
to define this term to determine when the actions of a private body are covered by the provision.   
i. Parliamentary Interpretation 
During the debates preceding the passage of the HRA 1998, both Houses of Parliament discussed 
specifically what the provisions under section 6 were designed to capture.  The general proposal 
was that the definition of public authorLW\VKRXOGKDYHDEURDGVFRSHµ,Q the course of 
parliamentary debates on the passage of the Human Rights Act, it was clear that private bodies 
delivering privatized or contracted-out public services were intended to be included within the 
VFRSHRIWKH$FWWKURXJKWKHµSXEOLFIXQFWLRQV¶FRQFHSW¶.15 In the White Paper on the Human 
Rights Bill, the definition of a public authority was stated in wide terms:  
Examples of persons or organizations whose acts or omissions it is intended should be 
able to be challenged include central government (including executive agencies); local 
government; the police; immigration officers; prisons; courts and tribunals themselves; 
and, to the extent that they are exercising public functions, companies responsible for 
areas of activity which were previously within the public sector, such as privatized 
utilities.16 
This view was supported by the Lord Chancellor (Lord Irvine of Lairg) in his statement on the 
%LOOZKHUHLQKHQRWHGWKDWµ>F@ODXVHLVGHVLJQHGWRDSSO\QRWRQO\WRREYLRXVSXEOLFDXWKRULWLHV
such as government departments and the police, but also to bodies which are public in certain 
respects but not others.  Organizations of this kind will be liable under Clause 6 of the Bill for 











 Home Office, Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill (White Paper, CM 3872, 1997) at para 2.2. 
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DQ\RIWKHLUDFWVXQOHVVWKHDFWLVRIDSULYDWHQDWXUH¶17  Subsequent contributions to the 
Parliamentary debates also noted the importance of the broad classification of public authorities 
and denounced the idea of creating a definitive list of which types of private bodies exercising 
public functions would be caught by the provision.  Indeed, they believed an exhaustive list of 
this sort would be unnecessarily limiting and ill-suited to adaptation over time.  Instead, the 
favoured DSSURDFKWRGHWHUPLQLQJZKDWFRQVWLWXWHGµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶ZDVWROHDYHWKH
issue for the Courts to decide on a case-by-case basis: 
The drafters of the Bill have wisely included a broad, inclusive definition of what 
constitutes a public authority.  They have done so because it is only possible on a 
case-by-case basis, looking at the particular body, the nature of the functions and the 
circumstances in which they are discharged, for the courts to come to a conclusion as 
to whether the activity falls on the side of a public function.18 
As a result, the determination of what constitute µIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRI
the Act has been left to the Courts.  However, as will be shown below, the Courts have failed to 
incorporate the broad interpretation advocated by Parliament.   
ii. Judicial Interpretation 
Several cases have considered WKHPHDQLQJRIµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶DQGDWWHPSWHGWR
determine whether a private company is caught by the provisions of section 6.  The majority of 
these decisions relate to the provision of housing and care; however, the precedent set is 
instructive for defining functional public authorities.  
The first case to GHDOZLWKWKHWHUPµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶ZDVPoplar Housing 
Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue.19  In this case, the local authority was 
under a statutory duty to provide or secure the provision of housing for certain homeless people, 
a task which they delegated to Poplar, a private housing association.  Poplar sought to evict a 
tenant they believed to be intentionally homeless; the tenant argued that such action was a breach 
of her Article 8 rights.  In their submission, Poplar argued they were neither a standard public 
authority nor a body performing functions of a public nature and therefore their actions did not 
fall under the scope of the HRA.  Lord Woolf CJ in the Court of Appeal identified three factors 
                                                          
17
 HL Deb 3 Nov 1997, Vol 582, Col 1227-1312. 
18
 Ibid by Lord Lester of Herne Hill. 
19
 (2001) 4 All ER 604 
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which would lead to the interpretation that a function is one of a public nature: statutory 
authority for the action; the extent of control over the function exercised by the public authority, 
and; a close relationship between the acts and the activities of a public body.20 µ7KHPRUHFORVHO\
the acts that could be of a private nature are enmeshed in the activities of a public body the more 
OLNHO\WKH\DUHWREHSXEOLF¶21 
Close ties between the body and the public authority form the foundation of an institutional 
UHODWLRQDODSSURDFKWRGHILQLQJµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶7KLVDSSURDFKHPSKDVL]HVWKH
institutional arrangements between the entities.  In this case, Poplar was so closely assimilated to 
the local authority that it could not be said that is was performing a private function. This 
DSSURDFKEURDGO\FODVVLILHVµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶WKURXJKDQH[DPLQDWLRQRIWKHSXEOLF
body, its relationship with other bodies, both public and private, and its position in statutory 
arrangements.22  +RZHYHUWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDODSSURDFKLVLQVXIILFLHQWWRH[SOLFLWO\GHILQHµIXQFWLRQV
RIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶.  It provides for a simplistic view of the issue, attaching significance to what 
WKHERG\µLV¶UDther than what the functions are.  It limits the applicability of the provisions of 
section 6(3)(b) and is in direct contrast to the approach favoured by Parliament during Hansard 
ZKHUHLQWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORUVWDWHGWKDWLQWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶
µWKHIRFXVVKRXOGEHRQWKHLUIXQFWLRQVDQGQRWRQWKHLUQDWXUHDVDQDXWKRULW\¶23  Following the 
Poplar case, the Court retained elements of the institutional approach in their interpretation but 
H[SDQGHGWKHWHVWIRUµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶WRDOVRDVVHVVWKHIXQFWLRQRIWKHERG\LQOLQH
with the Parliamentary interpretation.   
Specifically, the case of Parochial Church Council of the Parish of Aston Cantlow, etc. v 
Wallbank24 confirmed elements of a functional approach to interpreting the status of a private 
body.  Aston identified relevant factors that should be considered, mainly: the extent to which the 
function is publicly funded, whether the body is exercising statutory powers; and whether the 
                                                          
20
 Ibid at para 65. 
21
 Oliver supra note 14 at 330. 
22
 Oliver, supra note 14 at 481.  
23
 Lord Chancellor, supra note 17; this line of reasoning is echoed in ECtHR judgment Costello Roberts v UK App 
No 13134/87 (1993) 19 EHRR 112.  
24
 [2003] UKHL 37 
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body is taking the place of a central government or local authority in providing the function or is 
providing a public service.25 
The case of Aston was followed by YL v Birmingham City Council26 which remains the 
SUHFHGHQWLDOIRXQGDWLRQIRUWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶7KH+RXVHRI
Lords looked at three key areas in deciding the case.  First, they assessed whether the private 
actor was profiting from the provision of the services delegated to it by WKHORFDODXWKRULW\µ,Q
particular, their Lordships believed that the performance of functions for commercial gain 
µSRLQWHGDJDLQVWWKRVHIXQFWLRQVEHLQJSXEOLF¶27  The motivation for the provision of services in 
this case was commercial, undertaken by a for-profit company; the fact that the profit came from 
the local authority rather than a private individual was insufficient to classify the actions as 
public.  Second, the Court noted the contractual arrangement between the local authority and the 
care home.  Lord Woolf in Poplar addressed the issue of contractual obligations, statingµ>D@
public body in order to perform its public duties can use the services of a private body.  Section 6 
should not be applied so that if a private body provides such services, the nature of the functions 
is inevitably SXEOLF¶28  Finally, the Court noted the significance of any statutory or coercive 
powers the body possessed.29  The existence of these powers would lend themselves to the 
assertion that the private body was performing functions of a public nature.30 
The reasoning of the House of Lords in YL was subsequently interpreted and applied in the case 
of R (Weaver) v London and Quadrant Housing Trust.31  This case concerned the provision of 
social housing by the Trust.  The applicant alleged that the termination of his tenancy was a 
violation of his Convention rights under the HRA, which the Trust was obligated to respect by 
virtue of their status as a functional public authority.  The Court agreed, identifying several 
                                                          
25
 Ibid at para 12. 
26
 [2007] UKHL 27 
27
 :LOOLDPV$µ3XEOLFDXWKRULWLHVZKDWLVDK\EULGSXEOLFDXWKRULW\XQGHUWKH+5$"¶LQ'DYLG+RIIPDQHGThe 
Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law, (Cambridge University Press 2011) 51. 
28
 Poplar, supra note 19 para 58. 
29
 These would include for example a private run prison or mental health facility where the subject was detained 
involuntarily.   
30
 This was confirmed in the case of R (on the Application of A) v Partnerships in Care Ltd (2002) 1 WLR 2610 
wherein a private mental hospital was found to be performing a function of a public nature because the hospital had 
coercive statutory power to detain the patient under the Mental Health Act 1983 and was under statutory duties 
under the Registered Homes Act 1984 to provide adequate staff and facilities.   
31
 [2009] EWCA Civ 587; See also Barr & Ors v Biffa Waste Services Ltd (No 3) [2011] EWHC 1003 which 
similarly confirmed the principles of YL for defining a functional public authority.   




of public subsidy for the provision of the housing by the Trust.32 Second, the Trust was assisting 
the local authority in completing its statutory duties.33  Third, the provision of subsidized housing 
was the opposite of a commercial activity and could only be described as governmental in 
nature.34  Finally, the Trust was acting in the public interest in the provision of its service.35  
7KHUHIRUHLWZDVKHOGWKDWWKH7UXVWZDVSHUIRUPLQJµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶ZKLFKPXVWEH
compatible with the HRA.   
The preceding discussion demonstrates the lack of clarity concerning the determination of 
functional public authorities for the purposes of the HRA.  The reasoning and analysis 
underpinning the case law incorporate subjective elements in determining when a private body 
may be caught by the provisions.  Broadly speaking however, there are a few consistent criteria 
which may be used to determine whether a private actor is a functional public authority.  These 
include: the extent to which its action is publicly funded or subsidized; whether its actions are 
governed by statutory authority or contractual arrangements; whether the entity in question 
possesses any coercive powers over the individual; whether the body is acting in its own 
commercial interest; and whether there is a public interest in performing the function in question.   
iii. Future Interpretation 
The judicial LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶is criticized for being too narrow in 
its scope.  In response, several proposals have been advanced to clarify the position of section 
6(3)(b).  The Joint Committee for Human Rights (JCHR) published reports on the Meaning of a 
Public Authority in 200336 and 200737 identifying key factors in the determination that a private 
body is a functional public authority.  It suggested: the determination should be made without 
reference to the nature of the organization involved; the previous role of the Government in 
exercising the same function should be persuasive; there should be an element of public funding; 
the function should serve a public rather than commercial interest; and the focus should be on the 
                                                          
32
 Ibid at para 68. 
33
 Ibid at para 69.   
34
 Ibid at para 71. 
35
 Ibid at para 71. 
36
 Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Meaning of a Public Authority under the Human Rights Act, (2003-04, 
HL 39, HC 382). 
37
 Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Meaning of a Public Authority under the Human Rights Act, (2006-07, 
HL 77, HC 410). 
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nature of the function being performed.38  Following these reports, two Bills were proposed in 
2008 and 2009 which sought to clarify the position, however, neither proceeded past the initial 
stages.  Instead, Parliament has imposed explicit statutory provisions declaring that the private 
entities involved are performing functions of a public nature.39   
Such a provision on the face of a relevant statutory measure brings clarity to the status of the 
body in question.  In the absence of a general requirement to include such a provision, however, 
the issue will continue to be dealt with on a case by case basis.  Certainly there is no explicit 
statutory provision clarifying the status of CSPs in the retention of communications data.  It 
follows that the TXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHUWKH\TXDOLI\DVµIXQFWLRQDOSXEOLFDXWKRULWLHV¶for the 
purposes of section 6 in this context will ultimately be a matter for the courts.  In making that 
determination, the courts must pay close attention to the statutory provisions on data retention as 
they relate to CSPs and how these provisions relate to the factors identified in the established 
case law.   
&63VDQGµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶ 
,QGHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHU&63VSHUIRUPµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶LWLVuseful to first establish 
the precise remit of their actions.  The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 
stipulates that CSPs, when placed under a notice by the Home Secretary,40 are required to retain 
communications data, including that information linked to subscriber information (names, 
addresses, and identifying information of account holders), service use data (dates, times, 
durations, and end points of communications), and traffic data (locations of the user and recipient 
of communications).  This information must be stored for a period of up to 12 months by the 
CSP, preferably in a database separate from those used by the CSP for business purposes, in 
order to facilitate access by law enforcement and national security aims.   
The procedures requiring data retention for law enforcement and national security objectives 
must be distinguished from those which allow for retention for the business purposes of the 
company.  Retention for these purposes is provided for the in the Data Protection Act (DPA) 
1998 and the Privacy and Electronic Communication Regulations (PECR) 2003.  These 




 See Health and Social Care Act 2008 s 145. 
40
 Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 s 1. 
   
Holmes 11 
 
instruments provide a traditional regulatory framework for the business operations of companies 
which collect and process personal data.   
These instruments establish safeguards for the retention of data and provide that such data may 
only be retained when it satisfies specific requirements.  Data may be retained only as long as 
necessary for business purposes and following that period it must be anonymized or deleted.41  
Similarly, the data can only be used for legitimate commercial reasons for which the company 
has received the users consent; any other use is in violation of the DPA and PECR and gives rise 
to liability.42  The same is true for any unwarranted disclosure of data.43  These instruments do 
not provide for a mandatory data retention regime; it remains at the discretion of the company to 
retain data subject to these limitations.  It must also be noted that, under these provisions, the 
security, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies can only access data which is legitimately 
retained.  They cannot compel companies to retain more data than is necessary for these 
purposes, nor can they require the retention of data for longer periods to facilitate investigations.  
This leaves a gap in the capabilities of law enforcement in respect of communications data.   
It is not in itself sufficient that companies are required by statute to collect and retain data 
beyond their ordinary business purposes which could be subject to the DPA and PECR.44  This 
GRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\DOORZ&63VWRIDOOXQGHUWKHKHDGLQJRIµIXQFWLRQDOSXEOLFDXWKRULW\¶
However, the aims of the collection and retention processes, along with the judicial reasoning 
provided for in YL, discussed in the following analysis, provide for a strong case that these CSPs 
DUHLQIDFWH[HUFLVLQJDµIXQFWLRQRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶.45  The primary function of this retention is 
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 It must be acknowledged that often companies are required by regulations to collect and retain some forms of data 
for potential future use by law enforcement.  Notably, s 6 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1967, amended by the 
Communications Act 2003, required television dealers collect personal information to facilitate the notification of 
sale and hire televisions sets, until repealed by Schedule 21 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013.  
Similarly, regulatory regimes which have traditionally governed telecommunications and internet companies have 
utilized self- or co-regulatory regimes to govern service providers (see: Koops B, Lips M, Nouwt S, Prins C, 
Starting Points for ICT Regulation: Deconstructing Prevalent Policy One-Liners (The Hague 2006)). However, the 
legislative framework governing CSPs does not fall under the remit of self- or co-regulation.  Rather, state 
intervention is required to ensure companies satisfy these requirements and perform functions which otherwise they 
would be unwilling or unable to do. See: 2IFRPµ,GHQWLI\LQJ$SSURSULDWH5HJXODWRU\6ROXWLRQV3ULQFLSOHVIRU
Analysing Self- and Co-5HJXODWLRQ¶'HF 
45
 A similar argument has been developed regarding the Internet Watch Foundation, where it can also be argued that 
the IW)LVSHUIRUPLQJµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHVHSULQFLSOHV6HH/DLGODZ(µ7KH
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to facilitate law enforcement.  Using traditional telecommunications systems, such collection of 
data would have been under the purview of law enforcement and permitted public authorities.46  
By requiring the retention of this data by CSPs, functions are executed under the guise of private 
actions which can be utilised solely by the state.  When coupled with the principles established in 
the relevant case law&63VFDQEHVDLGWRVDWLVI\WKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIDµIXQFtional public 
DXWKRULW\¶QDPHO\SURYLGLQJDVHUYLFHZLWKDVRFLDOEHQHILWEHLQJSXEOLFO\IXQGHGSRVVHVVLQJ
statutory underpinning, and carrying out a governmental function.  The following tracks the 
legislative developments which lead to this conclusion and the subsequent impact on human 
rights. 
Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 
As a result of the capability gap between data retained by CSPs during their ordinary business 
dealings and data desired by law enforcement, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 
(ATCSA) 2001 was enacted, under which a voluntary code was introduced to allow CSPs to 
retain communications data for periods longer than necessary for business purposes in order to 
facilitate law enforcement and national security operations.  The issue of whether such retention 
would place CSPs within the definition of a functional public authority was addressed during the 
deliberation of the ATCSA Code of Practice.  Therein, the Home Secretary stated the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VSRVLWLRQWKDWWKHUHWHQWLRQRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQVGDWDE\&63VZDVµDSULYDWH
function that arises out of the commercial service that the communication service providers 
SURYLGH¶47 and retention would be classified as such regardless of whether the data was retained 
for their own commercial functions or under the provisions of the Code of Practice.  Any such 
requirements to comply with human rights obligations would have to be set forth in the Code 
itself.   
While the provisions of ATCSA did place additional requirements on CSPs to retain data, it is 
argued that in the specific instances of this case, the Government were correct in their assertion 
                                                          
5HVSRQVLELOLWLHVRI)UHH6SHHFK5HJXODWRUV$Q$QDO\VLVRIWKH,QWHUQHW:DWFK)RXQGDWLRQ¶ [2012] Intl J L & Tech 
312; DQG0F,QW\UH7-µ,QWHUPHGLDULHV ,QYLVLELOLW\DQGWKH5XOHRI/DZ¶(March 2008) BILETA Conference Paper.  
46
 Collection of data and access by public authorities was governed in a piecemeal fashion by several statutes 
including: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000; Police and Criminal Evidence Act Schedule 1; Wireless 
Telegraphy Act 2006 s 48; and the Telecommunications Act 1984 s 94.   
47
 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Draft Voluntary Code of Practice on Retention of Communications Data 
under Part 11 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001, (2002-03, HL 181, HC 1272) 6. 
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that these requirements did not meet thHWKUHVKROGRIµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶Two details 
are key to this conclusion.  First, while there was an obligation to retain the data under the Code 
of Practice, such an REOLJDWLRQZDVµYROXQWDU\¶&63VZHUHXQGHUQRGLUHFWVWDWXWRU\UHTXLUHPHQW 
to retain any particular data for any set period of time.  The voluntary nature of these agreements 
lends itself to the conclusion that the retention was a private function.  Second, where CSPs did 
retain data, they only retained that which they already generated and collected for business 
purposes.  No additional categories of data were collected and retained; rather all the data had a 
clear commercial value for the CSP.  It is unlikely that the future use of retained data by law 
enforcement would be sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the function be in the public 
interest.   
It is important to note the specific requirements of ATCSA as it related to these retention regimes 
and distinguish them from later legislation.  It is these further developments in the law which 
expanded retention outside the scope of purely business functions, and therefore engage s 6(3)(b) 
HRA.   
The Data Retention Regulations of 2007 and 2009 
Data retention was expanded at the supranational level in 2006 when the European Parliament 
and the Council adopted Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in 
the provision of publicly available communication services or public communications 
networks.48  7KHSXUSRVHRIWKLV'LUHFWLYHZDVµWRharmonize the obligations on providers to 
retain certain data and to ensure that those data are available for the purpose of the investigation, 
detection and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each Member State in its national 
ODZ¶49   The Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2007 and the Data Retention (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2009 gave domestic effect to this Directive requiring the retention of 
certain categories of data generated by CSPs.  These Regulations permit retention if notice is 
given by the Secretary of State to the relevant service provider, despite the provisions of the 
PECR and DPA which previously governed this data and limited the scope of its use in the 
commercial sense.  Any such notice allows for CSPs to derogate from requirements under the 
                                                          
48Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the retention of data generated or processed I 
connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications networks (2006) OJ L105/54. This 
Directive amended Directive 2002/58/EC which was given domestic effect in the PECR 2003.   
49
 Ibid at Recital 21. 
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DPA and PECR which govern private retention, for listed categories of data and data retention 
periods.50  Once provided with the notice, CSPs are under a positive duty to retain the data stated 
in the notice and a failure to do so may result in civil proceedings being initiated by the Secretary 
of State.51  While these provisions place the CSP under a duty, the retention required does not 
extend beyond that data which is required in the ordinary course of business.  The mere fact that 
a CSP is under an obligation to retain the data does not in itself satisfy the criteria for declaring it 
a public function as the data retained possesses potential commercial value.  However, 
subsequent developments in the legislation have distinguished this retention which is ancillary to 
business purposes from that done in the public interest. 
Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act (DRIPA) 2014 
The Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC was challenged before the European Court of Justice 
in the case of Digital Rights Ireland. This case questioned whether the Directive was compatible 
with, among others, Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of the European Union concerning privacy 
and the processing of personal data, and Article 8 of the ECHR.  In its judgment, the Court 
H[DPLQHGZKHWKHUWKH'LUHFWLYH¶VSURYLVLRQVVDWLVILHGWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIQHFHVVLW\DQG
proportionality in instituting the expansive and indiscriminate retention of personal data.  The 
court held that it did not, emphasizing that the retention captured data of all persons regardless of 
any link to serious crime;52 no provisions were made for privileged or sensitive 
communications;53 the retention was not subject to any prior judicial review;54 and the Directive 
allowed for overly expansive retention periods.55   
Following the invalidation of Directive 2006/24/EC, the Government acted quickly to pass the 
Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act (DRIPA) to clarify the scope of data retention in 
the UK, ensure that retention would continue, and confirm that adequate safeguards existed so 
retention would not fall foul of relevant human rights obligations.  DRIPA effectively replicated 
the provisions of the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009, placing on statutory 
footing the requirement that CSPs retain data.  Specific implementing measures and detailed 
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 Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009, SI 2009/859 s 5. 
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 Ibid at ss 10(5) ± 10(6). 
52




 Ibid at para 62. 
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 Ibid at para 63, 64.   
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obligations were enumerated in the Data Retention Regulations 2014 following the passage of 
this Act.56  The Act does not require the retention of any new categories of data; the data retained 
is still that which is generated through the ordinary commercial actions of the company.  
However, the value of this data to the company, due to technological developments and changes 
in business models is negligible.  Algorithmic processing allows for quicker processing of the 
data for use in applications such as targeted advertising which thereby require shorter retention 
periods.  Business models no longer rely on usage or call logs for billing purposes making the 
retention of specific traffic and user data unnecessary.  Additional requirements placed on CSPs 
under DRIPA regarding storage, security, and potential uses of the data further diminish its 
commercial value.  These developments lend themselves to the conclusion that, while the precise 
provisions regarding data retention may not have been substantially altered between the previous 
retention regulations and the 2014 Act, social and technological developments have contributed 
to a change in the status of their functions.  Traditional retention is therefore no longer 
necessarily in the best commercial interests of these companies.  Following the established case 
law, it can be argued that CSPs under DRIPA satisfy several of the recognized criteria to be 
FODVVLILHGDVSHUIRUPLQJµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶they are under statutory authority; the 
service is done in the public rather than private interest; and the primary objective of the 
retention is to perform a public function.   
First, under DRIPA, CSPs are performing a duty which is imposed on them by statutory 
authority.  Section 4 DRIPA provides that it is the duty of public communications providers to 
retain relevant communications data if provided with a notice by the Secretary of State.  This 
notice will include the company to which it relates, which services the data must be retained for, 
the data to be retained, the periods of retention, and any additional requirements or restrictions 
pertaining to the data.57  While the Secretary of State must take reasonable steps to consult with a 
CSP before issuing such a notice,58 this requirement may be waived if necessary.59  Further, this 
consultation does not require the Secretary of State to find the CSPs input or objectives 
persuasive.  Nor does the CSP have any ability to challenge a notice which requires them to 
retain data, regardless of any potential costs or hardships it might place on the company.  Rather, 
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 Data Retention Regulations 2014, SI 2014/2042. 
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 Home Office, Retention of Communications Data (Code of Practice, 2014) at para 3.3. 
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 Ibid at para 3.9. 
59
 Ibid at para 3.13. 
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s 10(5) states that CSPs provided with notices are under an obligation to comply with them and s 
10(6) asserts that a failure to comply with these requirements are enforceable through civil 
proceedings by the Secretary of State for an injunction or for the specific performance of a 
statutory duty under s 45 of the Court of Session Act 198860 or for any other appropriate relief.  
The requirements of DRIPA are indicative that the obligations on CSPs are rooted in statutory 
duties rathHUWKDQFRQWUDFWXDOREOLJDWLRQVLQGLFDWLQJWKDWWKHGXWLHVDUHµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLF
QDWXUH¶   
Second, the requirements imposed by DRIPA indicate that the retention of data is done primarily 
to satisfy a public interest objective.  Retention is used in the prevention, detection, and 
investigation of crime and the protection of national security interests.  In 2015, there were over 
700,000 pieces of data accessed by public authorities under this regime.61  Communications data 
can be useful for a variety of purposes, from verifying alibis to tracking suspected drug dealers, 
human traffickers, and fraudsters.  The value of communications data is clear.  Its retention 
fulfils a public interest and necessitates statutory provisions to ensure that companies can retain it 
without violating the provisions of the DPA and PECR.  Without these additional statutory 
provisions, companies would be obligated to delete the data once it was no longer required for 
business purposes, thereby diminishing the potential data pools that law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies would have access to in the execution of their duties.  The importance of 
this data has frequently been noted by the GovHUQPHQWµJLYHQWKHHVVHQWLDOUROHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV
data plays in assisting law enforcement agencies in protecting our citizens and bringing offenders 
to justice, the Government has for some years sought to ensure that it is retained and made 
available to apSURSULDWHSXEOLFERGLHVODZIXOO\FRQVLVWHQWO\DQGHIILFLHQWO\¶62  The retention of 
communications data by CSPs clearly fulfils a function which is in the public interest.   
Third, the public interest dimension does not have to displace the private commercial interest in 
order to qualify as a public interest function for the purposes of the HRA.  However, the specific 
requirements of DRIPA call into question the actual commercial value of the information 
retained.  Technological developments have altered the needs for companies to retain data; 
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 S 45(b) Court of Session Act 1988 states that the Court may, on application by summary petition, order the 
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differing plans and services mean that billing procedures are no longer what they were when 
these provisions were originally envisaged. This means that companies often do not have the 
need to keep the same types of data; the value of the data will be subject to diminishing returns 
the longer it is required to be retained.  This does not mean that retention has no value; but rather 
companies are focused on retaining categories of data which allow for profit rather than the 
traditional types required by statute.  This issue was taken into consideration in the drafting of 
DRIPA.  Lord West, for example, noted the problem in his contribution to the Parliamentary 
debates on the Bill: 
I was made aware that changes to communications technology meant that a record of 
communications information would no longer be held by communications service 
providers and that technology was changing the types of data that were available.  
This information was held SXUHO\DVLWZDVQHHGHGIRUWKHFRPSDQLHV¶ELOOLQJ
procedures ± that is why they kept it - and, as such was available for use by properly 
authorized state officials, in particular for prosecution of serious crimes and terrorism 
cases.  New technologies and methods of communication meant that firms were 
beginning to, and going to, charge differently.63 
If companies no longer need to retain the data, it would seem to follow that the company is 
discharging a public, as distinct from a private, function in retaining it.   
Even where the data retained does have some value to the company, the actual retention 
requirements diminish its commercial viability.  Due to the nature of retention notices and 
requirements concerning dDWDVHFXULW\DQGLQWHJULW\µit will often be the case that dedicated 
V\VWHPVZLOOEHFRQVWUXFWHGZLWKLQD&63IRUWKHUHWHQWLRQRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQVGDWD¶64  This is 
significant in that it essentially compels CSPs to create a database solely for the data it retains 
pursuant to a notice under DRIPA.  The 2014 Regulations acknowledge that there will be 
substantial costs incurred by the CSPs in complying with notices under DRIPA.65  As such, the 
Government may provide contributions to the costs of developing, maintaining, testing, and 
operating these systems incurred by the CSPs in complying with statutory obligations.66  This is 
particularly beneficial for CSPs who have to employ staff specifically to manage compliance 
with the requirements of the notice.  Neither the creation of these databases nor the hiring of 
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additional staff to facilitate the retention of communications data for policing and intelligence 
purposes represents a profitable function for the company.  Indeed, based on the precedent which 
IRUPVWKHEDVLVRIWKHGHILQLWLRQIRUµIXQFWLRQDOSXEOLFDXWKRULWLHV¶WKLVHOHPHQWRISXEOLFIXQGLQJ
is indicative WKDWWKH&63LVSHUIRUPLQJDµIXQFWLRQRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶ 
The lack of commercial justification for retention is further compounded by additional 
limitations placed on the access to and use of the communications data.  In most cases, the data 
retained pursuant to a notice must be stored in a dedicated retention and disclosure system, 
separated by security measures from the CSPs business systems.67  If data is retained subject to a 
notice, and would not be held for business purposes by the CSP, or should have been deleted 
under DPA and PECR standards, it must be protected from access by the company; the data may 
only be accessed and used subject to a lawful request.68  This means that even though the data 
has been retained by the company, they may not have access to it.  It further means that the 
retained data cannot be used for any additional business purposes which might be beneficial to 
the CSP, such as marketing or targeted advertising, when it is under the remit of the retention 
notice.  In this regard, CSPs are essentially proxies for government retention and collection 
rather than the functions being ancillary to their ordinary business purposes.  The dominant value 
of such retention therefore remains the public interest consideration.  As such, it can be argued 
that such retention by CSPs is a public function. 
Counter Terrorism and Security Act (CTSA) 2015 
As demonstrated above, DRIPA satisfies several of the requirements necessary to classify a 
SULYDWHDFWRUDVDµIXQFWLRQDOSXEOLFDXWKRULW\¶QDPHO\WKHVWDWXWRU\XQGHUSLQQLQJRIWKH
retention, the dominant public interest element, the lack of commercial value, and the element of 
public funding.  This argument that CSPs are performing a public function in retaining 
communications data under DRIPA is even more persuasive when examined considering the 
provisions of CTSA 2015.    The statutory duty to retain data on receipt of a notice under CTSA 
remains the same as under DRIPA.  However, CTSA expands the categories of data to be 
retained, moving beyond those normally generated by or necessary for business purposes, to 
imposing a private obligation on providers to retain data relating to IP addresses.  Specifically, 
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Part 3 CTSA allows the Secretary of State to require providers to retain communications data 
that will allow relevant authorities to link the unique attributes of an IP address to the person or 
device using it at a particular period of time.69  7KH$FWQRWHVWKDWWKLVLVQHFHVVDU\µDVWKHUHLVQR
existing legal requirement for CSPs to keep a log of devices and addresses, it is not always 
possible for law enforcement agencies to identify through their enquiries who was using an IP 
DGGUHVVDWDQ\SDUWLFXODUWLPH¶70   Liberty noted that µ[i]n principled terms, this marks a 
significant shift in the relationship between the State, companies, and service users, co-opting 
companies into the surveillance process in a novel way and it grant[s] the State power to require 
FRPSDQLHVWRJHQHUDWHQHZLQIRUPDWLRQ¶71  Not only would companies not be legally entitled to 
retain IP address information under the PECR and DPA as it satisfies no business purposes, but 
even if they were they would be unlikely to do so, due to the additional cost and risk of public 
backlash as regards its impact on privacy.  Consequently, IP address retention does not pose a 
viable commercial interest for CSPs.   
In contrast, the public interest consideration is much stronger.  In fact, in her introduction to the 
relevant section, then Home Secretary Theresa May acknowledged that the primary purpose for 
retaining the data was law enforcement.  
Companies generally have no business purpose for keeping a log of who used each 
address at a given point in time, which means that it is not possible for law 
enforcement agencies to identify who sent or received a message.  The provisions 
will allow us to require key UK companies to retain the necessary information to 
enable them to identify the users of their services.  That will provide vital additional 
capabilities to law enforcement in investigating a broad range of serious crime, 
including terrorism.72  
This line of reasoning was followed throughout the debates.  Emphasis was placed on the fact 
that failing to require companies to retain this information would result in less information for 
police and intelligence agencies. 
The provision would ensure that these data are available to law enforcement.  It 
would improve the ability of the police and other agencies to identify terror suspects 
who may be communicating with each other via the internet and plotting attacks.  It 
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would also help to identify and prosecute paedophiles, organized criminals, cyber-
bullies and computer hackers, and to protect vulnerable people.73 
IP address retention is tied to its value to the policing and intelligence services rather than its 
commercial value.  Its substantial role in protecting the public interest, coupled with its low 
value for CSPs and lack of business uses; the statutory authority which requires its retention; and 
the element of public funding (along the same lines as retention under DRIPA), all indicate that 
the retention of this data by CSPs is a public function for the purposes of section 6(3)(b) HRA.   
Investigatory Powers Act (IP)  
Technological developments and enhanced retention capabilities led to criticisms that the current 
legislation which govern these regimes is no longer fit for purpose. A sunset clause attached to 
DRIPA placed its expiration on the 31st December 2016 resulting in proposals for a new 
Investigatory Powers Act which received royal assent in November 2016.  As it stands, the IP 
Act replicates the current retention measures with the notable addition of the retention of Internet 
Connection Records (ICRs) and updated safeguards and oversight regimes.  It is argued that the 
inclusion of a new category of data in the form of ICRs places the functions of the CSPs firmly 
XQGHUWKHVFRSHRIµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKH+5$  These internet 
connection records are communications data which are broadly defined as records of the internet 
services that a specific device connects to.74  These records may establish which websites, 
messaging applications, or other internet services are used; when they are used; how they are 
being used, including whether it is through applications on a mobile phone or other device; and 
demonstrate a certain device has accessed an online communications service.75  The Government 
emphasized the need for the addition of this category of data in order to facilitate law 
HQIRUFHPHQWZLWKWKH+RPH2IILFHVWDWLQJLQWKHLURSHUDWLRQDOFDVHWKDWµ5DSLGWHFKQRORJLFDO
chaQJHPHDQVWKDWODZHQIRUFHPHQW¶VLQDELOLW\WRDFFHVVRQOLQH&'LVVLJQLILFDQWDQGZLOORQO\
get worse if it continues to be impossible to require communications companies to retain ICRs.  
More and more communications are taking place over the internet and as this happens it follows 
that aQLQFUHDVLQJSURSRUWLRQRI&'ZLOOEHXQDYDLODEOHZKHQLWLVQHHGHG¶76   
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The assumed value of ICRs to law enforcement demonstrates a departure point for the CSPs 
from services that possess a commercial value to those which are done in the public interest, 
WKHUHE\IDOOLQJXQGHUWKHDPELWRIµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶.  Several factors are important to 
this conclusion.  Representatives from various CSPs have acknowledged the lack of business 
value in retaining ICRs. Mark Hughes of VodafRQHQRWHGWKDWµ7KLVLVQRWDQDUHDWKDWZHPDNH
DQ\PRQH\RXWRI:HSURYLGHWKHYHU\EHVWVHUYLFHZHFDQWRDVVLVWODZHQIRUFHPHQW¶77 The 
requirements under the IP Act regarding ICR retention place additional burdens on the CSPs 
beyond what the company would traditionally impose themselves. For CSPs to satisfy the 
requirement that they retain ICRs, they must institute a process called Deep Packet Inspection 
(DPI) which is not currently the industry standard.  µ&63VZRXOGKDYHWRXSJUDGHWKeir networks 
to enable them to capture communications data utilizing Deep Packet Inspection technologies to 
fuOILOWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIFUHDWLQJDQGVWRULQJWKHVH,QWHUQHW&RQQHFWLRQ5HFRUGV¶78  This 
process requires extensive capabilities and equipment to collect and store the data, imposing an 
additional financial burden on CSPs.79  
In addition to the requirements placed on CSPs in collecting and retaining this new category of 
data, the IP Act places additional obligations on CSPs to secure and protect that data.80  BT noted 
in oral evidence before the Joint Committee on the IP Billµ:HDUHWDONLQJDERXWFROOHFWLQJGDWD
for the first time ± data that we have not collected before ± and the key is to ensure that our 
customers and their rights are protected.  The data has to be looked after very carefully, so we 
KDYHWRKDYHDFRPPHQVXUDWHVHFXULW\ZUDSDURXQGWKHP¶81  Like the data retained pursuant to 
DRIPA and CTSA, the data under the IP Act must be kept separate from the data generated for 
business purposes82 and may not be subsequently used by the CSP.83 The increased burden that 
the retention measures under the IP Act place on CSPs are mitigated by the requirement that 
FRPSDQLHVFDQµUHFHLYHDQDSSURSULDWHFRQWULEXWLRQLQUHVSHFWRIWKHLUUHOHYDQWcosts¶ where 
relevant costs are those incurred by complying with a notice.84  The overall effect of these 
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provisions is to remove the business value of the required processing and storage and instil an 
element of public funding; two further FULWHULDZKLFKLQGLFDWHWKDWWKHVHDUHµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLF
QDWXUH¶IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKH+5$ 
The Human Rights Argument 
&ODVVLI\LQJWKHDFWLRQVRI&63VDVµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶DOORZVWKHUHWHQWLRQRI
communications data to fall under the ambit of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the protections it 
guarantees.  If CSPs are not seen as public authorities for the purposes of the HRA then they are 
not bound by the obligation to comply with Convention rights.  This is particularly important due 
to the intrusive nature of retention and its impact on the right to respect for private life under 
Article 8 ECHR.   Communications data enables privacy intrusions.  In the Digital Rights 
Ireland case, Advocate General Cruz Villalon addressed the intrusive nature of communications 
GDWDQRWLQJVXFKGDWDPDNHVLWSRVVLEOHµWRFUHDWHDERWKIDLWKIXODQGH[KDXVWLYHPDSRIDODUJH
portioQRIDSHUVRQ¶VFRQGXFWVWULFWO\IRUPLQJSDUWRIKLVSULYDWHOLIHRUHYHQDFRPSOHWHDQG
DFFXUDWHSLFWXUHRIKLVLGHQWLW\¶85  ,WRFFXUVRQDµPDVV¶VFDOHFRYHULQJDOOXVHUVRIDservice or 
visiting a site.  It is essentially impossible to communicate without generating the data caught by 
these instruments and its impact is therefore expansive.  The European Court of Human Rights 
has confirmed that the mere act of retention and collection which potentially enables surveillance 
is sufficient to interfere with Article 8 rights.86  It is therefore necessary to provide for 
protections in the relevant instruments to ensure these rights and to guarantee that individuals 
have recourse to a remedy when their rights are violated.  
To this end, secondary instruments applicable to the investigatory powers instruments provide 
that privacy rights must be protected.  However, the protection of human rights through 
secondary instruments has been deemed insufficient by the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
when examining the duties of functional public authorities. The Committee said, µ:HDFFHSWWKDW
in a number of areas the protection offered by existing regulatory frameworks may provide some 
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protection for human rights.  However, without the application of the HRA, the protection 
RIIHUHGZLOOFRQWLQXHWREHDGLPLQLVKHGYHUVLRQ¶87   
The protection of human rights as regards data retention is effected by the provisions in the 
relevant legislation in DRIPA and CTSA, provisions under the DPA and PECR, and relevant 
secondary instruments such as the Retention Code of Practice.  Many of these principles mirror 
HRA requirements for proportionality and necessity.  Nevertheless, the provisions are not 
sufficient to protect human rights at the same level as the HRA.  The Government has argued 
that it is not the retention that interferes with human rights obligations; rather it is the subsequent 
access of this information.   
In all the hubbub about this matter, sight seems to have been lost of the fact that what 
these proposals involve is simply the retention of records of communications ± not 
even retention by the Government, but retention by the providers.  What that would 
allow is properly authorized access by law enforcement agencies only to the 
communications of those whom they have reasonable grounds of suspecting as 
meaning to do us harm.88 
Issues of access are required to satisfy human rights obligations because the retained data may 
only be accessed by relevant public authorities, a process which falls under the obligations of the 
HRA and its accompanying safeguards.  However, the argument that the interference here only 
occurs once the data has been accessed is misleading.  The European Court of Human Rights 
acknowledged this in Amann v Switzerland wherein it was held that the storing of data regarding 
the private life of an individual amounted to an interference with Article 8(1) ECHR.89  
Subsequently, the case of S and Marper v United Kingdom FRQFOXGHGWKDWµWKHPHUHUHWHQWLRQ
and storing of personal data by public authorities, however, obtained, are to be regarded as 
having direct impact on the private-life interest of an individual concerned, irrespective of 
whether subsequent use is PDGHRIWKHGDWD¶90  Further decisions have similarly focused on the 
potential threat and abuse caused by the collection and retention of data rather than the particular 
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access conditions,91 an issue that is becoming increasingly significant as technologies saturate 
society and generate exponentially increasing pools of data.   
The failure to classify CSPs as functional public authorities and thereby ensure that the collection 
and retention of this data is protected under the HRA diminishes individual protections.  
Currently, the only means of ensuring that retention meets human rights standards is through 
secondary instruments which require the Secretary of State to consider necessity and 
proportionality before issuing a notice.92  While this imposes some requirements, it leaves 
demonstrable gaps in the human rights SURWHFWLRQV,QGHHGWKH-&+5KDVQRWHGµ:KLOH
regulatory and inspection regimes clearly pay a very important role in ensuring the rights of 
services users and the quality of public services, they cannot be treated as a substitute for directly 
enforceabOH&RQYHQWLRQULJKWV¶93  The lack of directly enforceable Convention rights means that 
individuals whose data is collected and retained have no recourse to challenge retention which is 
done for law enforcement or national security purposes.  Indeed, the notice requirements placed 
on CSPs prevent them from even disclosing to individuals that their data is retained, even if 
individuals believe their data has been wrongly retained or retained in a manner inconsistent with 
the security, integrity, and destruction requirements of the relevant statute.  Further, it is 
significant that individuals often have no choice in choosing to enter a relationship with a service 
SURYLGHUDQGWKHUHIRUHQRDELOLW\WRSUHYHQWWKHGDWDUHWHQWLRQµ:KLOHLWLVSODXVLEOHWR
distinguish for HRA purposes between public and private regimes where those subjects are 
genuinely free to choose; it is much less so where the individual has no practical option but to 
DFFHSWWKHSULYDWHSURYLVLRQ¶94  
 By confirming the status of CSPs in exercising statutorily mandated retention as performing 
µIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFnature; there would be stronger human rights protections, particularly by 
providing individuals with the right to a remedy and the ability to challenge the compatibility of 
retention requirements with the provisions of the HRA and ECHR.   
Conclusion  
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Based on the current criteria as identified through relevant case law, CSPs are performing 
µIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶SXUVXDQWWRVERIWKH+XPDQ5LJKWV$FW7KHFXUUHQW
statutory requirements, set forth in DRIPA and CTSA, provide that the powers of retention 
exercised by CSPs are done through statutory authority; are publicly funded; and accomplish 
functions that are primarily in the public interest, often at the expense of their own commercial 
benefit.  The provisions under the IP Act demonstrate a further departure from retention for 
business purposes to a process principally satisfying a law enforcement and national security 
objective.  As the current law stands, any decision on whether the retention and collection 
SURFHVVHVZLOOVDWLVI\WKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIµIXQFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶PXVWEHOHIWWRWKH
Courts.  It is argued that human rights requirements would be better satisfied if this qualification 
was placed on the face of the relevant statutes.  Classifying CSPs as functional public authorities 
places an obligation on these companies to comply with the human rights provisions as 
established in the HRA 1998.  In doing so, not only would the protections currently set out in 
secondary instruments remain, but there would be increased protections, particularly by 
guaranteeing individuals rights of challenge and redress.  This protection is necessary due to the 
interference with private life that arises from the retention of data.   
 
